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Originally published as “Lo spazio atlantico 
contemporaneo: una storia ‘che non osa 
pronunciare il suo nome’?” in the journal 
Passato e Presente 100 (2017) 
 
Marco Mariano, Università del Piemonte Orientale  
A HISTORY THAT “DARES NOT SPEAK ITS NAME”? ATLANTIC HISTORY, 
GLOBAL HISTORY AND THE MODERN ATLANTIC SPACE 
 
Is there such a thing as an Atlantic history of the modern world? Or a modern dimension of 
Atlantic history? A good amount of empirical research falls into this broad, vague 
historiographical category, but this abundance in itself does not define the contours, tools and 
direction of this subfield of research. Studies on modern transatlantic relations reveal a 
paradox, or at least a significant gap between the empirical and theoretical levels, whereby the 
research being done on specific aspects of transatlantic exchange over the last two centuries 
is rich and thriving yet efforts to conceptualize and define the modern Atlantic as a unit of 
historical analysis are weak and inadequate. In fact, approaches that are having a deep impact 
on historical studies – namely Atlantic history and global history – are based on cultural trends 
and methodological assumptions that call into question the very possibility and usefulness of 
such a conceptualization due to matters of time, space and ideology. 
As far as periodization is concerned, the time frame within which the Atlantic space is 
considered a unit of historical analysis is seen to end in the early decades of the 19th century at 
the latest, due to the collapse of an international order based on transatlantic empires, the end 
of the so-called Atlantic revolutions and the decline of the slave trade. As for geography, the 
very notion of a 19th and 20th century Atlantic space or basin is contested on the grounds that 
it was reduced to a North Atlantic corridor by the declining role of Africa and the gradual 
subordination of Latin America to North Atlantic economic and strategic interests. Finally, 
conceptualizing the modern Atlantic space as a distinctively dense field of interactions with 
remarkable diffusional power can be seen as providing new ammunition to old, discredited 
discourses related to the primacy of the West and Cold War ideology. According to the 
dominant schools of historiography, then, the global scale is more relevant and useful than the 
Atlantic one for making sense of international and transnational interdependencies without 
falling prey to ideological agendas. 
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However, a significant number of original research outputs, mostly stemming from 
scholars of US history, are providing a multifaceted account of the dense networks created 
across the Atlantic by economic-technological and political-cultural exchanges, as well as 
reciprocal attempts at imitation and hybridization, and therefore by multiple analogies and 
convergences throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This has been the outcome of a 
transnational challenge to the exceptionalist/nationalist paradigm that is successfully 
internationalizing the study of US history. While it relies on multiple (i.e. hemispheric, Atlantic, 
Pacific, global) scales, I believe that this effort de facto sheds light on the peculiarities of the 
transatlantic space of interaction within the global context. European historians of the US are 
making a specific contribution to this effort. While they may not embrace a deliberately 
Atlantic outlook, they are affected by a geographical, cultural and institutional positionality 
that encourages the adoption of comparative and relational perspectives. These in turn help 
to highlight the specificity of the Atlantic space in the modern world.1 
This essay aims to reveal the gap that exists between a theoretical stalemate and the 
empirical dynamism of the study of modern transatlantic relations by situating that gap within 
the historiographical and cultural context from which it originated and discussing its causes, 
in the hopes of facilitating a more fruitful dialogue among different yet interrelated approaches 
to international history. 
 
 
1. Atlantic lost   
The prevailing assumption is that Atlantic history disintegrates at the threshold of the modern 
world, as if it faded away inside a global 19th and 20th century framework in which the internal 
dynamics that shaped the Atlantic “system” studied by many early modern historians could no 
longer hold. The theoretical and methodological discourse on the modern Atlantic world is 
unworthy of remark, notwithstanding a few exceptions. 
In Europe, the Transatlantic Studies Association is one of only entities attempting a 
multidisciplinary effort to redefine the “Atlantic paradigm”. Among the many US based 
historical research centers and foundations, only the German Marshall Fund and the German 
Historical Institute seem to have a consistent focus on the history of transatlantic relations. 
																																								 																				
1	Nicolas Barreyre, Michael Heale, Stephen Tuck and Cécile Vidal (eds), Historians Across Borders. Writing 
American History in a  Global Age, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.			
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While Mary Nolan’s The Transatlantic Century. Europe and America, 1890-2010 elicited a lively 
conversation among historians, its echo was largely confined to specialists, mostly American 
scholars of European history and European scholars of American history2. There is no 
discussion list devoted to transatlantic relations in the 19th and 20th centuries among the over 
200 lists available on H-Net. Finally, there are no textbooks, encyclopedias, readers or, with 
some partial exceptions, journals on the history of the modern Atlantic world. In other words, 
we have almost nothing to certify the existence of a subfield in international academia. 
 
 
 
This situation is due to an interplay of causes both external and internal to the prevailing trends 
in historical studies. The relevance of and concern for the Euro-American connection in the 
public arena has been declining ever since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
acceleration of financial and strategic globalization. However, the cultural context and the 
methodological development of current historical research are the main reasons the post-early-
modern Atlantic world is no longer considered a relevant and legitimate field of study. It is as 
if the legacy of the 1940s and 1950s, when Atlantic history amounted to the study of political 
and economic institutions, elites and white men and was instrumental in shaping a Eurocentric 
view of history and the world, hampers any new approach to the modern Atlantic. 
When does Atlantic history as we know it end? How important is periodization in defining its 
contours, scope and goals? As Philip Morgan and Jack Greene stated in their authoritative 
assessment of the state of the art, “the presumption seems to be that the expansion of 
European imperialism and the spread of commerce after 1800 make a global framework of 
more utility than an Atlantic one for those who are not content to continue to operate within 
traditional national and imperial frameworks”. Similarly, according to Emma Rothschild, after 
the transportation and communication innovations of the 1830s “Atlantic history ends 
because the Atlantic is no longer distinct, in a new world of literally worldwide or global 
																																								 																				
2 M. Nolan, The Transatlantic Century. Europe and America, 1890-2010, Cambridge UP, Cambridge 2010; “The 
Transatlantic Paradigm Reconsidered: Multidisciplinary Perspectives”, TSA Annual Meeting, Middelburg, 6-8 
July 2015. Besides the German Historical Institute conference “More Atlantic Crossings?” Washington, 7-9 June 
2012 other recent events tackling  these issues include “America: Still a European Power?”, University of Bologna, 
December 7-8 2012; “Rethinking the West in a Post-Cold War World”, University of Maryland – College Park, 
7 April 2015; “European Perspectives on the History of Transatlantic Relations. New Directions and Case 
Studies”, University of Eastern Piedmont, 14-15 December 2015. 
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connections.” While these authors have made the case for a more flexible interpretation of the 
chronological boundaries of this subfield, its prevailing terminus ad quem by and large overlaps 
with that of early modern history3. The International Center for the History of the Atlantic 
World founded by Bernard Bailyn at Harvard University in 1995, which was crucial for the 
emergence of the new Atlantic history, focuses on the timespan between 1500 and 1825, 
similar to that used in the discussion list H-Atlantic (1500-1800). In the significant amount of 
publications falling under this category, the Atlantic world of the early decades of the 19th 
century, if tackled at all, is usually considered as an appendix, a waning stream destined to lose 
strength amid the high seas of 19th century globalization. A few scholars have stressed how 
the effects of crucial elements of the Atlantic system like slavery continued to be on display 
several decades after the disintegrating process triggered by the revolutions, the collapse of 
transatlantic empires and the partial, gradual emergence of the nation-state4. However, little to 
no attention is being paid to those voices calling for a reconsideration of the Atlantic world 
not just as a sum of interactions between individuals and cultures connected by commercial, 
migratory and religious networks – a view indebted to social history and its dialogue with 
anthropology and the social sciences – but also as an epistemic space, a worldview to be tackled 
through a new socio-cultural history of ideas or rather a “history of meaning.”5 
This reluctance to challenge established chronological patterns reflects both the 
methodological premises of new Atlantic historians and their cultural-political assumptions, 
namely their urge to distance themselves from a previous generation of scholars who framed 
the Atlantic (i.e. American and French) revolutions as milestones in the rise of “Western 
civilization”, according to a teleological view of history that, in the words of David Armitage, 
“owed to NATO more than it did to Plato.”6 
																																								 																				
3 P. Morgan-J. Greene, The Present State of Atlantic History in ID, Atlantic History. A Critical Appraisal, Oxford UP, 
New York 2009, p. 21 (see also N. Canny, Atlantic History and Global History in the same volume); E. Rothschild, 
Late Atlantic History, in N. Canny-P. Morgan (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World (c. 1450 – c. 1850), 
Oxford UP, New York 2011, p. 637. C. Strobel, The Global Atlantic, 1400 to 1900, Routledge, New York 2015 
stresses the interplay between the Atlantic and global scale in early modern history. On the emergence of the new 
Atlantic history see D. Armitage, Three Concepts of Atlantic History, in D. Armitage-M. Braddick (eds.), The British 
Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002; B. Bailyn, The Idea of Atlantic History, “Itinerario”, 
20 (1996), pp. 19-44 later expanded in Atlantic History. Concepts and Contours, Harvard UP, Cambridge 2005; A. 
Games, Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities, “American Historical Review”, 111, 3, June 2006, 
pp. 764-81; W. O’Reilly, Genealogies of Atlantic History, “Atlantic Studies” 1, 1, 2004, pp. 66-84. 
4 for Alan Karras the terminus ad quem is the 1880s, which the abolition of slavery in Cuba and Brazil, see The 
Atlantic World as Unit of Study  in A. Karras-J.R. McNeill (eds.), Atlantic American Societies. From Columbus through 
Abolition 1492-1888, Routledge, New York 1992, pp. 1-15. 
5 E. Rothschild, Late Atlantic History, p. 640. 
6 D. Armitage, Three Concepts of Atlantic History, p. 14.  
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As a consequence, the Atlantic history that has come of age in the last few decades, while 
aimed at being a “history without borders,” has only barely scratched the surface of 
challenging, when not downright reinforcing, the traditional chronological boundaries 
between early modern and modern history. It has, however, significantly altered its spatial 
boundaries. If applied to the period between 1500 and 1800, the Atlantic scale highlights 
characteristic early features of globalization – imperial structures; means of communication 
and transportation; mobility of merchants, slaves and workers; and the circulation of capital, 
goods and ideas – that would later inform the history of the world.   
While from this perspective the Atlantic field of interaction ends up being swallowed up by 
the global integration of the major world regions by the end of the early modern period, from 
the perspective of global history it has hardly ever been a historical or geographical unit of 
analysis, even less so since the 19th century, which allegedly marked “the birth of the modern 
world” or “the transformation of the world.”7  
Just like the new Atlantic history, this new approach to world history stems from the 
methodological and cultural critique of the work of an earlier generation of scholars – 
exemplified by William McNeill’s The Rise of the West (1963) and revived in the post-9/11 
climate of opinion thanks the works of renowned scholars like Niall Ferguson – for adopting 
what is seen as a Eurocentric outlook and an essentialist view of history predicated on the 
linear, inevitable and triumphant “rise of the West.”8  
In fact, many distinct threads and sensibilities overlap within global history. Some not only 
question the idea of a European/Western specificity in the context of world history but also 
challenge the very notion that European expansion and the consequent Atlantic exchanges 
and interactions in the early modern era are significant precedents of modern globalization. 
Christopher Bayly, for example, singles out the decades between 1760 and 1830 – “the first 
age of truly global imperialism” – as the crucial phase for the integration of international 
society, while he considers earlier European expansion as part of a multipolar and poorly 
																																								 																				
7 C. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914. Global Connections and Comparisons, Oxford, Blackwell 2004; J. 
Osterhammel, ( The Transformation of the World. A Global History of the Nineteenth Century, Princeton UP, Princeton 
2014 (Die Verwandlung der Welt : eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts  C.H. Beck: Munchen 2009.  
8	Critical	discussions	of	the	notion	of	“the	West”	are	provided	by	C.	Browning-M.	Lehti	(eds.),	The	Struggle	
for	the	West.	A	Divided	and	Contested	Legacy,	Routledge,	New	York	2010	and	by	a	special	issue	of	Telos	
on	“The	West:	Its	Past	and	Its	Prospects”	n.	168,	Fall	2014	edited	by	Russell	A.	Berman,	which	includes	
engaging	essays	by	Jeffrey	Herf	and	Michael	Kimmage.		
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integrated “archaic globalization” and dismisses the exchanges of the early modern Atlantic 
economy, including the slave trade, as proto-capitalistic developments.9   
While projecting this globalist outlook onto the 19th and first half of the 20th century helps 
shed light on obscured chapters and silenced people, it seems ill-equipped to tackle, let alone 
answer, several crucial questions. What is the significance of the partial, gradual rise of the 
modern state with respect to the “world without borders” and the multiple transnational 
circulations that lie at the core of the global history agenda? More importantly, how can we 
reconcile this global, decentered and anti-Eurocentric gaze with the need to make sense of 
European (and later Euro-American) hegemony after the “great divergence” of the late 18th 
century created an enduring gap in economic growth between England and China and by 
extension between the West and Asia?  
In The Birth of the Modern World Bayly tackles the latter question as follows: “No world history 
of this period could possibly sidestep the central importance of the growing economic 
dominance of Western Europe and North America … A history of this period, therefore, has 
to demonstrate a number of different and apparently contradictory things. It has to chart the 
interdependence of world events, while allowing for the brute fact of Western domination. At 
the same time it has to show how, over large parts of the world, this European domination 
was only partial and temporary.”10  
In his brilliant overview of the controversies surrounding global history, Sebastian Conrad 
similarly argues that since the late 18th century transnational contacts and exchanges 
can be understood only in the light of the hegemonic role played by Europe and, later, 
by the US: the integration of capitalist markets, technological and military superiority, 
and the pretense of superiority of the universalistic value system of the West displayed 
their effects worldwide. While Western hegemony is undeniable, Conrad maintains, it is 
important to stress its spatial and chronological limits and its nature as accidental rather than 
inevitable. 11 
In fact, with the notable exception of Sven Beckert’s Empire of Cotton, major studies in global 
history often struggle to make sense of the modern Atlantic world as a field of interactions 
																																								 																				
9 N. Canny, Atlantic History and Global History, pp. 322-23; Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 45, 41. Bayly 
maintains that “In its early stages, the ‘expansion of Europe’ was simply one among several contemporary 
examples of globalization, rather than a world system in the making,” p. 42.  
10 Ibid., pp. 2-3.	
11	S.	Conrad,	What	is	Global	History?	Princeton:	Princeton	UP,	2016.	
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with a peculiar role in the global context because of the multiplicity and density of its 
connections and its expansive, diffusional power. This is especially true of the “American 
century” and the rise of the United States as a great world power. As American historian 
Andrew Cayton put it, “to incorporate the United States … into world history is like 
incorporating Starbucks into the history of coffee. It has to be done, but at what price? Even 
if there is no celebration of Starbucks, its history will define the terms of the larger debate”. 
The risk is that, in the words of Thomas Bender, “the United States in global history might all 
too easily morph into US history as global history”, thus undermining the very foundations of 
this approach to the history of the world.12  
Jürgen Osterhammel’s The Transformation of the World aptly exemplifies this impasse. Received 
by critics as more Eurocentric than Bayly’s text (to which it is often compared), his 
ambitious, outstanding work seems to oscillate between the search for a decentered 
perspective on the 19thcentury world and the 	
acknowledgement of specific aspects of European/Western hegemony; as such, it fails to deal 
adequately with the Atlantic scale. On the one hand, some of the five “visual angles” he 
proposes address specific aspects of the Euro-American space. He argues that one of the 
defining features of the 19th century is what he calls “asymmetric efficiency growth”, which 
involves higher levels of productivity, an articulation of the state structure and military power 
(a “military great divergence”), first in Western European societies and later in the US and 
Japan. For all its limitations and exceptions, “the rise of Europe, the United States and Japan 
in comparison with the rest of the world was more than ever before or since an 
incontrovertible fact”, writes Osterhammel (910).  
The author also uses the term “asymmetric reference density” (911) to refer to the amount 
and circulation of ideas in a given society and its cultural production, including its ability to 
absorb what is produced elsewhere through translations and the press. The peculiar nature of 
the Atlantic space emerges in this respect as well: “instead of a multiplicity of cultural models, 
the West now appeared as the global standard”, both as a model to be imitated and as a 
reference against which identities were shaped in other world regions through selective 
identification and opposition (912). 
																																								 																				
12 A. Cayton, Putting the United States in Its Place, “Reviews of American History”, vol. 34 n. 4 (Dec. 2006), pp. 573-
580; T. Bender, A Nation Among Nations. America’s Place in World History, Hill & Wang, New York 2006, p. 298. Si 
veda anche M. Adas, From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon. Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American 
Experience into World History, “American Historical Review”, vol. 106 n. 5 (Dec. 2001), pp. 1692-1720.  
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However, these insights do not lead the author to acknowledge the modern Atlantic as a unit 
of analysis, which he sees as an increasingly disarticulated space vis à vis an increasingly 
integrated Pacific area: “In the nineteenth century, the Atlantic and the Pacific were subject to 
different tendencies. The ‘peaceful’ ocean experimented a phase of integration in every 
domain; the two sides of the Atlantic drifted apart in reality and in people’s minds” (100).  
Even though Osterhammel acknowledges the impact of mass mobility and the transportation 
revolution on transatlantic relations in the second half of the 19th century, he still reinforces 
the notion that the Atlantic space was submerged by the high seas of modern globalization. 
Remarkably, he relegates the North American experience to a rather marginal position 
precisely during the decades that saw the US evolving from a postcolonial outpost to a great 
economic and technological power closely integrated with the major global transnational 
currents, at least from the time of the Civil War. It is no accident that The Transformation of the 
World lists about 30 entries on the US and 90 on China in its rich table of contents. To 
Osterhammel, focusing on what makes the modern Atlantic world peculiar and how 
modernity plays a role in defining the contours of this world seem irrelevant if not utterly 
unacceptable, tainted by the bias of present-mindedness: “Historians today need not allow 
political rhetoric to drive them into making essentialist statements about Europe. Their 
discipline is in the fortunate position of being able to leave behind political-ideological 
struggles over the conception of Europe” (906). 
Thus, not only does the crucial issue of the origins and causes of Western hegemony in the 
modern world go inevitably unanswered, as Enzo Traverso has remarked,13 but the very 
possibility to conceptualize the modern Atlantic as a subfield of study is also undermined. Just 
like in Atlantic history, patterns of periodization and the issue (or specter?) of presentism in 
global history make it very problematic to look at the modern Atlantic as a historical unit of 
analysis. As a result, the critique of the West as a civilizational block and an imperial ideology, 
and the challenge to traditional, Eurocentric visions and practices of historical research based 
on political history and the primacy of the nation-state end up implicitly ignoring, if not openly 
contesting, the modern Atlantic space as both a “mental map” adopted by those who lived 
during the 19th and 20th centuries and a relevant scale for the study of modern international 
history. 
																																								 																				
13 E. Traverso, Rethinking the Nineteenth Century. On Jürgen Osterhammel’s The Transformation of the World, 
“Constellations”, vol. 21, 3, 2014, pp. 425-431. 
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2. The modern Atlantic as mental map 
 
Before it became a tool for historians, the Atlantic space had been a metageographical notion 
by which actors from all walks of life on both sides of the ocean situated their experience in a 
context that could hardly be understood through local or national lenses. The awareness of 
being part of a dense international and transnational network of exchanges, risks, 
opportunities, actions and reactions spread across the Atlantic throughout the “long 19th 
century” and beyond. 
Unexpected and somewhat obscure yet unequivocal evidence of such Atlantic awareness is 
provided by the history of the Italian states in the 1830s. When Piedmont established 
diplomatic relations with the US, Foreign Affairs Minister Clemente Solaro della Margarita 
wrote the following in his instructions to his chargé d’affairs in Washington, Augusto Avogadro 
di Collobiano: 
 
Nos relations avec l’Amérique septentrionale paraîtraient au premier coup d’œil ne devoir être que des relations 
purement commerciales, vue la distance qui nous sépare, mais les distances se rapprochent aujourd’hui par la 
multiplication des voies de communication et les rapports sans nombre qui se sont établis entre l’ancien et le 
nouveau monde ont créé entre eux une telle complication d’intérêt que toute commotion politique qui se prépare 
ou qui surgit dans l’un des deux continents doit avoir, nécessairement un grand retentissement dans l’autre. Les 
traités de commerce cachent souvent des vues politiques ou du moins peuvent leur être associés14.  
 
By the end of the 1830s the transportation revolution was in full swing as steamers dramatically 
cut short the duration and increased the regularity of transatlantic crossings, thus deeply 
affecting the circulation of goods and people in terms of cost and volume. The instructions 
given to the first chargé d’affairs of an Italian state in the New World must be read in the light 
of this transformation, as well as in the context of the “Western question” originated by the 
collapse of the Spanish empire in the Americas, the wave of Latin American independence 
movements and the consequent competition for commercial and political influence in the 
region. The US government and European monarchies all greatly extended their consular and 
																																								 																				
14 Solaro della Margarita, Istructions to Avogadro di Collobiano, Chargé d’affaires of the Kingdom of Sardinia in 
the Unitd States, 7 December 1838, registro 292, Archivio del Ministero degli Esteri del Regno di Sardegna, 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma.  
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diplomatic networks at a time when trade was recovering and liberal and republican ideas were 
spreading across the ocean, thus creating a vital connective tissue that proved instrumental for 
the integration of the modern Atlantic world.15  
A few years later, the shrinking of the Atlantic that so alarmed the champion of legitimist 
reaction Solaro della Margarita was greeted with hope by the great African American leader 
and abolitionist Frederick Douglass. In 1846 he crossed the Atlantic to participate in the 
World’s Temperance Convention in London. His subsequent triumphant tour through 
England helped inspire one of his most influential speeches, delivered in 1852:  
 
A change has now come over the affairs of mankind. Walled cities and empires have become unfashionable. The 
arm of commerce has borne away the gates of the strong city. Intelligence is penetrating the darkest corners of 
the globe. It makes its pathway over and under the sea, as well as on the earth. Wind, steam, and lightning are its 
chartered agents. Oceans no longer divide, but link nations together. From Boston to London is now a holiday 
excursion. Space is comparatively annihilated. -- Thoughts expressed on one side of the Atlantic are distinctly 
heard on the other.16   
  
In fact, Douglass had made his ocean crossing aboard a segregated Cunard Lines steamer 
where he had barely survived an attempt by American travelers to throw him off the boat. 
However, his two-year stay overseas helped shape his vision as well as the transnational 
character and international influence of the abolitionist movement, which by 1848 was part of 
a larger transatlantic exchange between reformist and revolutionary movements.  
As connections between the Old World and the New were reinforced by technological 
progress, a new, modern Atlantic space took shape and replaced the old one based on colonial 
empires and the slave trade. It is therefore unsurprising that more and more people began 
adopting an Atlantic mindset just as technology began transforming the circulation of 
information to such an extent that the ocean started being seen as not only a barrier but also 
a bridge. The inauguration of the transatlantic cable in 1858 triggered a wave of celebrations 
																																								 																				
15 P. Butel, Histoire de l’Atlantique de l’antiquité à nos jours, Perrin, Paris 1997, pp. 243-47; G. Rogers Taylor, The 
Transportation Revolution 1815-60, Rinehart, New York 1951; R. Blaufarb, The Western Question. The Geopolitics of 
Latin American Independence, “American Historical Review”, 112, 3 (June 2007), pp. 742-763. On 19th-century 
consular and diplomatic networks see M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919, London-New York: 
Longman, 1993; F. de Goey, Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism, 1783-1914, Pickering & Chatto, London 
2014 e D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella service. British consuls since 1825, Longman, London 1971. 
16 F.J. Douglass, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? An Address Delivered in Rochester, New York on July 
5 1852” in The Frederick Douglass Papers, Series 1, ed. J. Blassingame et al., (5 voll., Yale UP, New Haven 1979-
1992), II, pp. 359-388. 
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carrying unmistakable emotional and ideological overtones. According to the London Times, 
“The Atlantic is dried up, and we become in reality as well as in wish one country. The Atlantic 
Telegraph has half undone the Declaration of 1776, and has gone far to make us once again, 
in spite of ourselves, one people”17. While the beginnings of this modern Atlantic space were 
to some extent Anglo-American, in the decades between the mid-19th century and World War 
I it came to include large chunks of Western Europe and Latin America thanks to dense 
networks of commercial, financial and migratory flows as well as cultural and political 
exchanges. 
Mass migration from Europe to the Americas is a case in point, both for its magnitude (51 
million Europeans moved to the New World from the time of the Napoleonic wars to the 
Great Depression) and because it reflected and amplified multiple connections (technological, 
economic, demographic, political and cultural) spanning the Northern and Southern Atlantic. 
This unprecedented access to transoceanic mobility accounts for “the widespread and deep-
rooted habit to see America as a possible resource” by those living in 19th century Liguria, as 
documented by Italian historian Antonio Gibelli. Increased mobility helped create bonds of 
affection that intertwined with the impersonal forces of the Atlantic economy. As a 
progressive priest working on the education of poor peasants in the Vara Valley wrote in 1875: 
“my pupils are scattered all over the world, some of them are soldiers, many are in Prussia, 
Russia, France, in the United States, many in California, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Lima and 
not even one that I know is oblivious of my affection, and all, all of them write me letters.”18 
The rise of nation-states and the consequent increase of borders stopped neither mass 
migrations nor any other force behind Atlantic integration. On the contrary, ideologies and 
practices of “nation building”, while inevitably particularistic in their outlook, shared several 
important traits, and their widespread circulation through Europe and the Americas in the 
mid-19th century helped shape a sense of belonging to a community of modern and “civilized” 
nations that defined itself by its opposition to a barbarian “other.” In the second half of the 
19th century colonial power took a new direction, as J.R. McNeill wrote: “within the confines 
of the Atlantic world, colonialism had begun to take on a north-south profile more than an 
east-west one … It was as if geopolitics now recognized the tectonic plates that underlie the 
																																								 																				
17 quoted in	 I. Tyrrell, Transnational Nation. US History in Global Perspective since 1789, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2007, p. 25. 
18 quoted. in A. Gibelli, La risorsa America, in A. Gibelli e P. Rugafiori (a cura di), Storia d’Italia. Le regioni dall’Unità 
a oggi. La Liguria, Einaudi, Torino 1994, p. 601.  
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continents, separating the Old World from the New.”19 However, far from disintegrating the 
Atlantic world, the transition from a longitudinal to a latitudinal axis as the organizing principle 
of international power gave it a geopolitical and ideological dimension eventually encapsulated 
by Walter Lippmann’s enduring notion of an “Atlantic community.” In 1917, as the civilized 
West was being devastated by total war, he wrote in The New Republic: “Britain, France, even 
Spain, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian nations and Pan-America are in the main one 
community in their deepest needs and their deepest purposes … we cannot betray the Atlantic 
Community by submitting … what we must fight for is the common interest of the Western 
world, the integrity of the Atlantic powers.”20 
In sum, during the so-called long 19th century a new awareness of Atlantic connections took 
shape and helped mold the mental maps of reactionaries, revolutionaries, migrants and pundits 
across class, political, national and racial lines. It was a sort of transatlantic “imagined 
community” circulated mostly, but not exclusively, by the printed media. These mental maps 
helped shape a modern Atlantic space that gradually shifted to the North throughout the 20th 
century as a consequence of the marginalization of Africa and the increasingly peripheral role 
played by Latin America in the world economy, though we cannot dismiss this shift as a Anglo-
American special relationship writ large. Finally, this modern Atlantic space was neither a 
civilizational block nor the advanced stage of linear, inevitable progress but, rather, a field of 
interactions whose distinctive features were the density of its connections and its ability to 
stimulate attraction as well as revulsion in other world regions.     
 
3. The modern Atlantic: long, dense, connected 
 
Mental maps help bring to light the qualitative and subjective factor, which is rarely 
investigated, if not totally ignored, by those who maintain that the modern Atlantic space fades 
away amid the undifferentiated ocean of globalization. Scholars taking globalist and 
quantitative approaches have shown how innovations in transportation and communication 
tested out in the Atlantic space were applied elsewhere just a few decades later. They have also 
stressed that areas of intense circulation of goods and people existed in other world regions as 
																																								 																				
19 J.R. McNeill, “The End of the Old Atlantic World. America, Africa, Europe, 1770-1888” in Karras-McNeil, 
Atlantic American Societies, p. 265. 
20 W. Lippmann, The Defense of the Atlantic World, “The New Republic”, 17 February 1917. 
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well. However, a quantitative approach focused mainly on the volume of demographic and 
commercial flows, the mileage of railways, the tonnage of merchant ships and the convergence 
of commodities prices seems ill-equipped to capture the peculiar density, multiplicity and 
diffusional power of Atlantic connections throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. 
The transnational turn that has been transforming the study of American history over the last 
twenty years has helped bring these Atlantic peculiarities to light. Two broad-ranging, 
groundbreaking volumes by Thomas Bender and Ian Tyrrell have successfully provided a new 
synthesis that challenges the exceptionalist narrative and the primacy of the nation-state in the 
understanding of American history. While not explicitly embracing an Atlantic framework, 
these works de facto shed light on how the Atlantic space has helped shape the American 
experience throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and, consequently, point to the need to 
problematize the modern Atlantic as a unit of historical analysis21. In fact, Bender has argued 
elsewhere that the periodization of Atlantic history should be recast so as to include modern 
history:  “If most of those scholars who sail under the flag of the Atlantic world do not carry 
their inquiries beyond the age of revolution, the topic remains … The Atlantic and global 
connections and comparisons that have been so illuminating from the sixteenth, seventeenth, 
and eighteenth centuries need to be carried forward into the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, where they promise to be just as fruitful.”22 
In a similar vein, Donna Gabaccia has explicitly addressed the need for a new periodization 
and spatialization of the Atlantic world in an important essay published in the first issue of 
Atlantic Studies, a journal dedicated to promoting a multidisciplinary, transnational approach to 
the Atlantic space and defying rigid periodization patterns.23 Her essay launched a three-fold 
challenge: a long-term analysis of specific features of Atlantic flows across established 
chronological boundaries; interaction between different research currents focusing on the 
Atlantic economy, the circulation of goods and workers, and the African diaspora, respectively; 
and, finally, the quest for an interdisciplinary approach to the modern Atlantic. However, even 
a cursory look at the recent literature shows how these challenges have been only partially met. 
Over ten years later there remains a gap between the amount of new research tackling single 
																																								 																				
21 T. Bender, A Nation among Nations. America’s Place in World History, Hill & Wang, New York 2006; Tyrrell, 
Transnational Nation. 
22 T. Bender, Foreword, in J. Cañizares Eguerra-E. Seeman (eds), The Atlantic in Global History, 1500-2000, Pearson 
Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River 2007, pp. xx-xxi. 
23 D. Gabaccia, A Long Atlantic in a Wider World, “Atlantic Studies”, vol. 1, 1, 2004, pp. 1-27.    
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aspects of transatlantic relations and the lack of a methodological debate on the modern 
Atlantic. What follows is an overview of the three major currents of this vast, diverse literature, 
with an emphasis on research addressing 19th century developments, which is somewhat less 
circulated and discussed.   
  
The contribution of the cliometric approach to the study of the 19th century Atlantic economy 
as a crucial step towards modern globalization has resonated in the public sphere, for example 
in debates over international trade and migrations, but it seems a bit removed from the 
conversation with other historical approaches. In their influential study based on international 
commodities prices, Kevin O’ Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson maintain that the decline in 
transportation costs and consequently prices that took place in the North Atlantic in the first 
half of the 19th century was a turning point in the history of economic globalization: “the date 
for big bang theories of global economic history should be the 1820s, not the 1490s.”24 This 
reading sheds light on the periodization of globalization, but it overlooks its spatial dimension. 
The geographic contours of the Atlantic economy are taken for granted and the transition 
from the Atlantic to the global scale is hardly problematized, as it seems to occur according to 
a natural pattern of “evolution.”25  
Similarly, several works by global historians acknowledge the pivotal role played by the North 
Atlantic economy during the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. In 
the words of Steven C. Topic and Allen Wells, “our approach acknowledges the central role 
that Western European and North American capitalists, laborers, and technology played in 
the metamorphosis of world trade and finance and agrees that entrepreneurs on both sides of 
the North Atlantic were fundamental to the era’s profound transformations.”26 However, they 
also stress how the recognition of such a central role has been exaggerated and has helped 
obscure developments in other world regions often described as passive and static according 
to a typically Eurocentric and orientalist view of the “other.” 
 
																																								 																				
24 K. O’ Rourke-J. Williamson, When Did Globalization Begin?, “European Review of Economic History”, vol. 6, 
1, 2002, p. 37. On the relation between quantitative approaches and exceptionalism see E. Rauchway, More Means 
Different: Quantifying American Exceptionalism, “Reviews in American History”, vol. 30 (2002), pp. 504-516. 
25 K. O’Rourke-J. Williamson, Globalization and History: the Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy, MIT 
Press, Cambridge 1999. 
26 S. Topic, A. Wells, Commodity Chains in a Global Economy, in E. Rosenberg, A World Connecting, 1870-1945, 
Harvard UP, Cambridge 2012, p. 596. 
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Another challenge to prevailing patterns of Atlantic periodization and spatialization comes 
from the transnational approach to Latin American independence. From this perspective, far 
from being a rigid demarcation separating the old colonial regime from the rise of republican 
nation-states, the 1810s and 1820s were a time of transition in which the intertwining of 
preexisting imperial structures with new political, economic and social dynamics transformed 
relations between Latin America and Europe. The critique of prevailing nation-based and 
teleological approaches to independence movements allows us to tackle the hybrids that were 
created out of the old imperial structures and the new national states, the quest for abolition 
and the enduring legacy of slavery. Undermining the rigid partition between early modern and 
modern eras leads one to think in terms of a “long Atlantic” that, in the case of Latin America, 
embraces the abolitions of the 1880s and, according to some, the Spanish-American War.27 
 
Finally, the third and, as stated above, most influential body of literature that significantly 
contributed to a rethinking of the modern Atlantic space is provided by the transnational turn 
in the study of US history. The internationalization of American history often ends up 
illuminating an Atlantic landscape that, while closely integrated with the global context, is also 
a discrete unit of analysis. Economic connections are once again a case in point. Already in 
the early 1990s Ian Tyrrell was arguing that “the Atlantic trading network is, for much of 
American history, a key region within which to explore links of a transnational kind. This need 
not entail the old project of the United States as an extension of European civilization or, still 
less, English colonialism”28. Since then, scholars have made significant progress in exploring 
the links connecting the modern Atlantic world by taking a transnational approach to 
American history understood as a “way of seeing,”29 a reading of the national past that cuts 
across both national boundaries and barriers between subfields. 
While research on the economic and financial integration of the US in the Atlantic and global 
space has focused mostly on the post-Civil War era, recent studies show how such integration 
was already affecting antebellum America. Jay Sexton argues that mid-19th century US foreign 
																																								 																				
27 M. Brown, G. Paquette (eds.), Connections after Colonialism. Europe and Latin America since the 1820s, U. of Alabama 
Press, Tuscaloosa 2013; C. Thibaud-G. Entin-A. Gòmez-F. Morelli, L’Atlantique Révolutionnaire. Une Perspective 
Ibéro-Américaine, Les Perséides, Bécherel 2013. 
28 I. Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” American Historical Review, 96 (4) 
1991, p. 1040. See also Sven Beckert’s remarks in AHR Conversation: on Transnational History, “American Historical 
Review”, (Dec. 2006), p. 1463. 
29	“AHR	Conversation:	On	Transnational	History,”	American	Historical	Review,	December	2006,	p.	1454.		
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policy was influenced by American financial dependence on British banks, and that this 
financial link between London and New York was part of a complex pattern of integration 
and competition that lasted for much of the 19th century. Similarly, Sam Haynes has 
investigated the financial dependence and “commercial slavery” of the US within the 
framework of the “unfinished revolution”, that is, American cultural and political 
subordination vis à vis the British empire. And Gabaccia has studied the implications of US 
activism in commercial diplomacy throughout the prewar decades. Indeed, the signing of 
dozens of bilateral treaties with countries around the world (14 in Europe, 8 in the Americas, 
4 in Asia and 2 in Africa signed between 1815 and 1848) laid the legal and material foundations 
for the massive flows of goods and people that encompassed a mostly Atlantic space for 
decades and eventually spilt over into the global scale.30 
These economic links intertwined with others to help shape an Atlantic space that was by no 
means exclusively “white.” The recent surge of research on the Haitian revolution, long 
forgotten and not included by historians among the “Atlantic revolutions,” shows that a 
transatlantic framework informed the fears and the hopes fueled by that event. On the one 
hand, the widespread dread that the contagion of racial revolution might spread to the Western 
hemisphere and eventually to North American shores turned into a legitimation of white 
supremacy in the American South, which billed itself as the bulwark against miscegenation and 
abolitionism, considered tools of British imperialism. On the other hand, the Haitian 
precedent inspired the radical wings of the abolitionist movement and reinforced the opinion 
held in moderate circles that a gradual process towards emancipation was needed to prevent a 
revolutionary outcome.31  
The transnational approach to abolitionism reinforces the notion that the modern Atlantic 
was also a “black Atlantic” and, at the same time, it rescues from oblivion the connections 
																																								 																				
30 J. Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy. Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, 1837-1873, Oxford UP, 
New York 2005  e The Monroe Doctrine. Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America, Hill & Wang, New York 
2011; S. Haynes, Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World, U. of Virginia Press, 
Charlottesville 2010; D. Gabaccia, Foreign Relations. American Immigration in Global Perspective, Princeton UP, 
Princeton 2012, cap. 1 which stresses the relevance of the global scale. Jessica Lepler, The Many Panics of 1837: 
People, Politics, and the Creation of a Transatlantic Financial Crisis, Cambridge. Eng,, Cambridge UP 2013.   
31 M. Clavin, Toussaint Louverture and the American Civil War: The Promise and Peril of a Second Revolution, U. of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2009; D. Geggus (ed.), The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World, U. 
of South Carolina Press, Columbia 2001; A. Gomez, Le spectre de la révolution noire. L’impact de la révolution haïtienne 
dans le monde atlantique, 1790-1886, Presses universitaires de Rennes, Rennes 2013; Jean M. Hébrand and Rebecca 
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between abolitionism, capitalism and social reform. Seen through an Atlantic lens, the prewar 
abolitionist movement must also be understood as part of the campaigns for free trade that 
were part and parcel of the quest for economic freedom typical of 19th century liberalism. That 
movement was also affected by the European revolutions of 1848, which sent multiple shock 
waves across the Atlantic with the abolition of slavery in French and Danish possessions as 
well as the fear of Marxist inspired social revolution spreading to the New World. Finally, 
framing the history of abolitionism within a larger, Atlantic context is relevant for the study 
of the causes of the American Civil War, which is better understood in the light of the abolition 
of slavery in the British empire and its impact in the Caribbean.32 
In sum, these transnational perspectives on prewar America stress how, far from being 
disarticulated in isolated fragments or submerged by the high tide of globalization, the Atlantic 
space at midcentury was taking shape as a particularly dense and complex field of interactions. 
Legacies of the past (slavery and abolition) interacted with new factors like the transportation 
revolution, the mass circulation of goods people, and cultural products, and finally the transfer 
of reformist and revolutionary movements formed within Euro-American societies 
throughout their modernization processes. Needless to say, these processes did not take 
place in a vacuum but, rather, were entangled with local, national, and global ones. In 
a recent, stimulating exchange on pre-Civil War America in the Journal of American 
History several historians argued that the prevailing view which posits the early 19th 
century as a time of transition “from an Atlantic world to a global one” applies to US 
history as well.  Yet, their engaging discussion of the limits of the globalization 
framework points to several unresolved issues: an “innocent imagining of the global” 
that obscures power relations, the ideological implications inherent in the 
absolutization of any given scale, the adoption of a globalizing jargon that obscures 
Atlantic, Pacific, and other spatially-defined processes of convergence.33   
																																								 																				
32 R. J. M. Blackett, Building an Antislavery Wall: Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement, 1830-1860, 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP 1983; E. Dal Lago, ‘We Shared the Same Hostility to Every Form of Tyranny’: 
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Nineteenth Century History”, 13 (3, 2012), pp. 1-27; M.W. Palen, Free-Trade Ideology and Transatlantic Abolitionism: 
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The Atlantic convergence was reinforced in subsequent decades, first with the communication 
revolution and the acceleration of nation building and later with the Second Industrial 
Revolution and the imperial turn, all of which had a deep and lasting impact within the Atlantic 
scale and, later, the global one. 
A transnational approach to the American Civil War also contributes to a re-periodization of 
the Atlantic space that looks ahead towards the major currents of the transatlantic exchange 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries at least as much as it looks back at the continuities with 
the colonial era. This body of literature by no means questions that slavery was the 
fundamental cause of a war that, in this respect, is still seen as peculiarly American. Rather, it 
situates that war within the rise of the territorial nation-state, meant as a tool to overcome old 
imperial patterns and achieve the self-determination typical of 19th century liberalism. In this 
light, the fact that the Civil War took place at the same time that nation building was occurring 
in Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Germany and Italy between the 1850s and the 1870s is due to 
the transnational and at times diasporic circulation of an “Atlantic liberalism” that came of age 
in 1848 and facilitated transnational convergence in areas like civil and military bureaucracy as 
well as economic policies until the 1870s, when nationalism began to prevail over liberalism 
as the organizing principle within old and new national states.34  
The recasting of these distinct but analogous cases of nation building within an Atlantic scale 
has led some historians to list them among the preconditions of modernization processes that 
took place in the second half of the 19th century and were significantly accelerated by the 
second industrial revolution. However, do we really have quintessentially Atlantic “trajectories 
of modernization” culminating between the end of the 19th century and the trauma of World 
War I? 
Hans Jürgen Puhle has maintained that the early modern and modern Atlantic space is 
characterized by patterns of modernization that, despite national and regional differences, 
share varying degrees of industrialization, democratization and bureaucratization. According 
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to this long-term perspective, while the European way prevailed in the early stages of the 
process, the diffusion of the modern state in the Americas and the rise of the US as a global 
player later led to the rise of an “Atlantic” or “Western modernization.” Through transatlantic 
exchange, the European matrix was adapted to the context of the New World and then 
throughout the 20th century the North American version prevailed and affected modern 
globalization in significant ways: “The Atlantic system has never been a one-way street, and it 
has always implied, at some critical junctures more than others, processes of transcontinental, 
transatlantic learning, though mostly not among equals: at certain points, some had to learn 
more than others, and for a long time some could afford to learn less.”35 
In a somewhat similar vein, although from a vantage point that is much less centered on 
Europe and political institutions, Josè Moya has discussed modern transatlantic exchanges as 
multiple, multidirectional interactions in which the impact of economic, technological, social, 
demographic, cultural and political modernization processes was more profound than in the 
past and, until World War I, affected the Atlantic space much more than the global one. In his 
view, modernity had turned from “ideology” into “way of life” by the turn of the 20th century, 
thus transforming the everyday life of millions of individuals, while in the early modern era 
and somewhat beyond that it had only affected elite circles. While such a transformation was 
becoming a mass phenomenon, its geographic range was mostly limited to Europe and the 
Americas, with some later extensions to other world regions. Before the turning point of 
World War I, for example, classic indicators of modernization like postal services and railways 
remained mostly exclusive to the Atlantic world. And while many of its protagonists felt at the 
time that they embodied global trends and embraced a universalistic outlook, their range and 
influence was far from global. While anarchist ideals were circulated by newspapers like 
Universal, Hijos del Mundo and Dos Vraie Vort, that circulation was mostly Euro-American. The 
same was true for May Day celebrations, which were typically enveloped by the rhetoric of 
Marxist internationalism.36 
These trajectories of modernization carve out multiple, changing geographies inside and 
outside the Atlantic space. As they intersect with other trajectories, they help generate the 
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networks and patterns of exchanges that global historians have brought to light. These 
networks, however, are not center-less. Their centers are, rather, connected by multiple links 
as well as by hierarchies of political, cultural and economic power. The transnational turn in 
American history has made another significant contribution here. By stressing the continuities, 
transformation and growing influence of Atlantic connections in the modern world, it has also 
shed light on the differences and hierarchies of power among the centers of globalization. In 
this respect, scholars who have shaped the research in their subfields include Samuel Baily, 
Donna Gabaccia, Dick Hoerder and Jose Moya on mass migrations to the Americas37 and 
James Kloppenberg, Daniel Rodgers and Axel Schafer on the social policies and reformist 
experiences that developed in response to the Second Industrial Revolution.38  
In a similar way, much of the recent literature on the turn-of-the-century imperial turn in the 
US points to the way that trajectories of modernization and geographies of power overlapped 
within the Atlantic space, with significant consequences outside of it. While several studies 
have emphasized how US imperialism in the Caribbean and the Pacific was informed by 
attitudes and policies forged during the westward expansion and the “Indian removal”, others 
are now showing how the US borrowed imperial policies from European colonial powers, 
especially the British empire. By questioning the primacy of the national tradition and the 
domestic realm, this transnational way of seeing has illuminated the role played by 
“transatlantic adaptation”39 in expansionist policies and other fields. 
In fact, the intensification of the transatlantic exchange at the turn of the century also had a 
strong cultural and ideological dimension, since it strongly undermined the oppositional 
dynamic between the New World and the Old that had been a foundational element of the 
political culture and public discourse of American republicanism for over a century. In the 
words of Daniel Rodgers, “for social policies to be borrowable across political boundaries, 
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there must be not only a foundation of common economic and social experience but also a 
recognition of underlying kinship. The polities in question must be seen to face similar needs 
and problems, to move within shared historical frames, and to strive toward a commonly 
imagined future.”40 
To be sure, as a real field of interactions but also as an imagined community, this Atlantic 
world was tragically shaken but not obliterated by the first total war. In fact, a growing body 
of literature shows how the 1920s anticipated many of the fundamental forces that shaped 
post-World War II transatlantic relations such as financial interdependence, cooperation in 
international organizations, the impact of Americanization on mass culture and consumption, 
and the circulation of African American culture. 
Finally, the enormous amount of research available on the international history of the decades 
after World War II can hardly be summarized here. Both the increasing adoption of a global 
outlook aimed at “provincializing” Europe and the West as well as the impact of sweeping 
methodological tides like the cultural turn have enriched and complicated the picture 
enormously41. The years between 1945 and the 1970s – a decade now widely acknowledged as 
a turning point for contemporary globalization42 – appear more complex and multifaceted than 
ever. Yet, despite the declining importance of Europe in the postwar era, these years also seem 
to witness the same tension between the Atlantic and the global scale that we have seen take 
place earlier. 
The historiography of the Cold War is a case in point. As a subfield it is going through a 
dramatic renewal and an expansion of its research areas thanks to both a dialogue with cultural, 
social, gender and environmental history and the adoption of global scales and perspectives, 
as exemplified by Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War and the multivolume Cambridge 
History of the Cold War.43 While it is undeniable that this global turn has vastly increased our 
understanding of the connections between the Cold War, on the one hand, and 
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decolonization, modernization, race, civil rights, etc. on the other, it is nonetheless 
questionable to view the global South as the crucial battlefield of a conflict whose epicenter 
was Europe. As Federico Romero maintains, “provincializing Europe is an epistemological 
necessity for global and international history, but hardly a scholarly strategy applicable to a 
conflict spawned in and about Europe, pivoted on the continent’s destiny, and eventually 
solved where it had its deepest and more relevant roots.”44 
Emerging from this literature is the need to recast the place of Europe and the Atlantic space 
within the global framework of the 20th century, including the post-World War II decades. The 
same is true for other influential studies addressing post-World War II transatlantic relations 
from different viewpoints. Classic interpretations like Charles Maier’s notion of a “consensual 
hegemony” exercised by the US over Western Europe or Geir Lundestad’s “empire by 
invitation” thesis share the implicit assumption that typically Atlantic preconditions and 
convergences made those relations possible.45 Finally, recent, broad-ranging studies by Mary 
Nolan, Victoria De Grazia and David Ellwood, notwithstanding the significant differences 
between them, raise similar questions about the relationship between the Atlantic and the 
global scale, as do numerous works exploring specific issues related to mass society and 
consumption, political cultures and movements, European integration and the role played by 
“non state actors.”  
We can discern three broad trends within this vast, diverse historiographical landscape: the 
impact of European perspectives, that is, of scholars whose origin, training or academic 
affiliation is European; the focus on long- and medium-term continuities in transatlantic 
convergence and interdependence; and the awareness that the postwar “Atlantic community” 
is to be situated within an interplay of regional, national and global scales that leaves no room 
for what Gabaccia has called “Atlantic parochialism.”46 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Global history is on the rise, as demonstrated by the wide acclaim for works like Sven Beckert’s 
Empire of Cotton and the series A History of the World edited by Jürgen Osterhammel and Akira 
Iriye. In her introduction to the fifth volume of the series, Emily Rosenberg pays tribute to 
Christopher Bayly’s attempt to come to terms with the tension between “the West and the 
rest” during the “great acceleration” that laid the groundwork for globalization between the 
second half of the 19th and the first half the 20th century. As Rosenberg writes, “although Euro-
Americans played a significant role in the creation and spread of modernity in this era, the 
many social and cultural networks that increasingly crisscrossed the globe helped to coproduce 
and accelerate the transformations.”47 
Rosenberg’s essay is an eloquent demonstration of the great potential of this global outlook, 
which is revitalizing historical studies by calling into question how the historical profession 
has conceptualized time and space until now. The same is true for Atlantic history, which 
shares with global history both an emphasis on transnational trends and a quest for a 
decentered, non-Eurocentric look at international history.    
The potential of these approaches inevitably entails some risks as well. Downplaying power 
relations as the cause of differences and asymmetries between the hubs of globalization and 
as the engines of global connections is one of them. Another risk is to read history backwards 
by over-emphasizing limited, superficial experiences of mobility, hybridization etc. and 
magnifying them as harbingers of globalization. Finally, as far as the critique of Eurocentrism 
is concerned, it is hardly surprising that the overtones of some of its proponents turned out 
to be no less ideological than certain apologists of Western primacy.  
The aim of this essay is to stimulate a conversation about the need to conceptualize the 
modern Atlantic space as a field of interactions that stands out for the density and multiplicity 
of the connections that shaped it, its diffusional influence and its hegemonic projection vis à 
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vis other centers of modern globalization. I argue that the reasons such a conversation is 
almost nonexistent are related to the rise of Atlantic and global history in international 
academia, although other causes outside academia are also at play.   
As we have seen, anti-exceptionalist approaches to crucial chapters of US history – the post-
revolutionary decades, the Civil War, the Second Industrial Revolution, the imperial turn and, 
finally, the rise of the “American century” with its peak in the globalizing 1970s – has brought 
to light transnational connections that were often situated within an Atlantic landscape. 
However, this diverse literature, which shares a way of seeing across national borders more 
than the adoption of a specific methodology, is not considered an integral part of Atlantic 
history. This is partly due to institutional factors. As Thomas Bender has noted, the prevailing 
notion within history departments in American universities is that 1815 represents the 
chronological endpoint of the Atlantic paradigm48 (and in fact the same is true in Europe). 
However, there are more deeply rooted reasons for the omission of the modern Atlantic world 
as a unit of analysis, which is all the more striking considering the quantity and quality of 
studies exploring single aspects of the interactions shaping that space. One of these has to do 
with a widespread cultural and historiographical climate of opinion in which dealing with 
transatlantic relations as a legitimate subfield seems suspect by definition. Yet, recognizing the 
directionality of a given process at a given moment in time does not amount to providing a 
metahistorical narration or an ideological construct. Neither does acknowledging the 
peculiarities and diffusional power of the modern Atlantic space both as a field of interactions 
and as one of several templates for modernity amount to attempting an ex-post invention of 
a self-contained, isolated world region and even less so a civilizational block sealed by rigid, 
hermetic borders. While the borders of the modern Atlantic space were obviously porous and 
mobile, as Josè Moya wrote, “they delineated quite clearly a space where things were happening 
that were not happening – or happening with much less intensity – elsewhere.”49 Emphasizing 
the porous, flexible nature of these borders should not imply the dissolution of that space in 
a space-less global world. 
Conceptualizing the 19th and 20th century Atlantic as a historical and geographical unit of 
analysis is thus a difficult yet promising, and to some extent urgent, task. It is difficult because 
of the burden of “the West”, to which it is immediately associated. The challenge with “the 
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West,” as with any other meta-geographical construct, is to distinguish between its ideological 
uses and its historical and geographical realities; or, as Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen put it, 
to “point out the conventional and constructed nature of the fundamental ideas of global 
geography, while yet denying that they are nothing but social constructs; […] [and] to uncover 
the political motivations behind metageographical conceptualizations, without implying that 
they are all reducible to strategic interests.”50 On the other hand, such efforts to rethink the 
modern Atlantic are both promising and urgently needed in order to facilitate a more fruitful 
dialogue between different sub-disciplines, overcome methodological mistrust and suspicions, 
and eventually achieve the cosmopolitan ideal of a history without, or beyond, borders.     
In a very effective passage of her essay in A World Connecting, Rosenberg suggests that defying 
false dichotomies is a precondition for understanding late 19th and early 20th century world 
history: “the emerging modernism of this increasingly networked era was one in which 
seemingly binary poles emerged as coproductive counterparts: homogeneization and differentiation, 
the global and the local, tras- or internationalism and nationalism, reason and spectacle. All of these sets are 
composed not of opposites but of vested complements that operated in creative tension with each other.”51  
If we want a similar creative tension to displace false dichotomies – between Atlantic and 
global scales, between early modern and modern eras – in our study of international history, 
then we must keep the history of the modern Atlantic world from becoming a history “that 
dares not speak its name.” 
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